PROJECT TITLE :
A New Cloud Service Mechanism for Profit Optimizations of a Cloud Provider and Its Users - 2017
ABSTRACT:
In this paper, we tend to try to style a service mechanism for profit optimizations of both a cloud provider and its multiple users. We tend to contemplate the matter from a game theoretic perspective and characterize the link between the cloud provider and its multiple users as a Stackelberg game, in which the strategies of all users are subject to that of the cloud supplier. The cloud provider tries to pick out and provision appropriate servers and configure a proper request allocation strategy to reduce energy price whereas satisfying its cloud users at the same time. We approximate its servers selection space by adding a controlling parameter and configure an optimal request allocation strategy. For each user, we style a utility operate that combines the.Net profit with time efficiency and attempt to maximise its value underneath the strategy of the cloud supplier. We formulate the competitions among all users as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). We tend to solve the problem by using variational inequality (VI) theory and prove that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium answer set for the formulated GNEP. Finally, we propose an iterative algorithm (IA), that characterizes the entire process of our proposed service mechanism. We have a tendency to conduct some numerical calculations to verify our theoretical analyses. The experimental results show that our IA algorithm will benefit each of a cloud supplier and its multiple users by configuring proper methods.
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