PROJECT TITLE :

Deterministic Detection of Cloning Attacks for Anonymous RFID Systems

ABSTRACT:

Cloning attacks seriously impede the safety of radio-frequency identification (RFID) applications. This paper tackles deterministic clone detection for anonymous RFID systems while not tag identifiers (IDs) as a priori. Existing clone detection protocols either cannot apply to anonymous RFID systems thanks to necessitating the information of tag IDs or achieve solely probabilistic detection with a few clones tolerated. This paper proposes three protocols—BASE, DeClone, and DeClone+—toward fast and deterministic clone detection for giant anonymous RFID systems. BASE leverages the observation that clone tags create tag cardinality exceed ID cardinality. DeClone is constructed on a recent finding that clone tags cause collisions that are hardly reconciled through rearbitration. For DeClone to attain detection certainty, this paper styles breadth first tree traversal toward quickly verifying unreconciled collisions and hence the cloning attack. DeClone+ additional incorporates optimization techniques that promise faster clone detection when clone ratio is relatively high. The performance of the proposed protocols is validated through analysis and simulation. This paper conjointly suggests feasible extensions to enrich their applicability to distributed style.