PROJECT TITLE:

Secrecy Rate Optimizations for a MIMO Secrecy Channel With a Cooperative Jammer - 2015

ABSTRACT:

During this project, we have a tendency to study different secrecy rate optimization techniques for a multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) secrecy channel, where a multiantenna cooperative jammer is employed to enhance secret communication in the presence of a multiantenna eavesdropper. Specifically, we tend to contemplate two optimization problems, namely, power minimization and secrecy rate maximization. These issues don't seem to be jointly convex in terms of the transmit covariance matrices of the legitimate transmitter and also the cooperative jammer. To circumvent these nonconvexity issues, we alternatively style the transmit covariance matrix of the legitimate transmitter and the cooperative jammer. For a given transmit covariance matrix at the cooperative jammer, we tend to solve the ability minimization and secrecy rate maximization problems based mostly on a Taylor series growth. Then, we propose two iterative algorithms to unravel these approximated issues. In addition, we tend to develop a robust scheme by incorporating channel uncertainties related to the eavesdropper. By exploiting S-Procedure, we show that these sturdy optimization issues can be formulated into semidefinite programming. Moreover, we consider the secrecy rate maximization problem based mostly on game theory, where the jammer introduces charges for its jamming service primarily based on the amount of the interference caused to the eavesdropper. This secrecy rate maximization downside is formulated into a Stackelberg game where the jammer and the transmitter are the leader and the follower of the game, respectively. For the proposed game, Stackelberg equilibrium is analytically derived. Simulation results are provided to validate the convergence and performance of the proposed algorithms. In addition, it's shown that the proposed robust theme outperforms the nonrobust theme in terms of the achieved secrecy rate and therefore the worst-case secrecy rate. Finally, the Stackelberg equilibrium answer has been validated through numerical results.