PROJECT TITLE :

Two-Hop Distance-Bounding Protocols: Keep Your Friends Close - 2018

ABSTRACT:

Authentication in wireless communications usually depends on the physical proximity to a location. Distance-bounding (DB) protocols are cross-layer authentication protocols that are primarily based on the round-trip-time of challenge-response exchanges and will be employed to ensure physical proximity and combat relay attacks. However, traditional DB protocols depend on the assumption that the prover (e.g., user) is during the communication range of the verifier (e.g., access purpose); one thing that may not be the case in multiple access control situations in ubiquitous computing environments furthermore after we would like to verify the proximity of our two-hop neighbour in an ad-hoc network. In this Project, we tend to extend ancient DB protocols to a two-hop setting, i.e., when the prover is out of the communication range of the verifier and so, they each would like to depend on an untrusted in-between entity in order to verify proximity. We tend to gift a proper framework that captures the foremost representative classes of existing DB protocols and give a general technique to extend traditional DB protocols to the two-hop case (3 participants). We analyze the security of 2-hop DB protocols and establish connections with the protection issues of the corresponding one-hop case. Finally, we demonstrate the correctness of our security analysis and the potency of our model by remodeling five existing DB protocols to the 2-hop setting and we evaluate their performance with simulated experiments.