PROJECT TITLE :
Social Norm Incentives for Network Coding in MANETs - 2017
The performance of mobile unintended network transmissions subject to disruption, loss, interference, and jamming can be considerably improved with the employment of network coding (NC). But, NC needs additional work for forwarders, together with extra bandwidth consumption because of transmitting overheads for redundant NC packets and extra processing because of generating the NC packets. Selfish forwarders might like to simply forward packets without coding them to avoid such overhead. This is especially true when network coding must be protected against pollution attacks, that involves further, usually processor intensive, pollution detection procedures. To drive selfish nodes to cooperate and encode the packets, this paper introduces social norm-primarily based incentives. The social norm consists of a social strategy and a name system with reward and punishment connected with node behavior. Packet coding and forwarding are modeled and formalized as a repeated NC forwarding game. The conditions for the sustainability (or compliance) of the social norm are identified, and a sustainable social norm that maximizes the social utility is intended via selecting the optimal design parameters, including the social strategy, name threshold, name update frequency, and the generation size of network coding. For this game, the impacts of packet loss rate and transmission patterns on performance are evaluated, and their impacts on the decision of choosing the optimal social norm are mentioned. Finally, sensible problems, as well as distributed name dissemination and also the existence of altruistic and malicious users, are mentioned.
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