PROJECT TITLE :

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ABSTRACT:

With an increasing penetration of wind power, there is possible to be an increasing need for quick-ramping generating units. These generators guarantee that no load is lost if supply drops due to the uncertainties in wind power generation. However, it's observed in apply that, in a presence of network constraints, quick-ramping generating units are at risk of act strategically and exercise market power by withholding their ramp rates. During this paper we model this gaming behavior on ramp rates. We tend to assume a market operator who collects bids in form of marginal prices, quantities, and ramp rates. He runs a ramp-constrained economic dispatch given the generators' bids, forecasted demand, and contingencies. Following the game-theoretic ideas, we tend to set up a multi-level optimization problem. The lower-level downside is that the ramp-constrained economic dispatch and the upper-level represents the profit maximization problems solved by strategic generators. The full problem is formulated as an equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints (EPEC). The result of the EPEC drawback could be a set of Nash equilibria. To tackle the multiple Nash equilibria problem, the concept of the extremal-Nash equilibria is outlined and formulated. We model the concept of extremal-Nash equilibria as one-stage mixed-integer linear programming problem (MILP) and demonstrate the application of this mathematical framework on an illustrative case and on a additional realistic case study with tractable results.