PROJECT TITLE :

To Transmit or Not to Transmit? Distributed Queueing Games in Infrastructureless Wireless Networks

ABSTRACT:

We tend to study distributed queueing games in interference-limited wireless networks. We tend to formulate the throughput maximization problem via distributed selection of users' transmission thresholds as a Nash Equilibrium Drawback (NEP). We 1st concentrate on the solution analysis of the NEP and derive sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium (NE). Then, we have a tendency to develop a general best-response-based algorithmic framework wherein the users can explicitly opt for the degree of desired cooperation and signaling, converging to totally different varieties of solutions, specifically: one) a NE of the NEP when there's no cooperation among users and 2) a stationary purpose of the Network Utility Maximization (NUM) drawback related to the NEP, when some cooperation among the users in the shape of (pricing) message passing is allowed. Finally, as a benchmark, we style a globally optimal but centralized answer technique for the nonconvex NUM problem. Our experiments show that in several eventualities the sum-throughput at the NE of the NEP is terribly shut to the worldwide optimum of the NUM problem, which validates our noncooperative and distributed approach. When the gap of the NE from the world optimality is non negligible (e.g., in the presence of “high” coupling among users), exploiting cooperation among the users in the shape of pricing enhances the system performance.