PROJECT TITLE :

Closed-Form Pricing in Multiuser Access Networks With Incomplete Information

ABSTRACT:

Pricing has been widely used to solve network optimization issues. In this paper, we study the case where the network service supplier (NSP) has incomplete information about the users, such as the specific user type. Formulating the pricing of the monopolistic NSP and therefore the flow control of the users as a 2-level hierarchical game, we have a tendency to 1st acquire closed-form equilibrium solutions that jointly maximize the benefits of the monopolistic NSP and therefore the users with heterogeneous quality-of-service (QoS) requirements. Then, based mostly on the closed-kind solutions, we think about a a lot of general and sensible multi-NSP and multiuser model. We have a tendency to further propose a completely unique one-sided job-hopping matching game to get stable NSP-user matching that may optimize network performance in an exceedingly multi-NSP and multiuser scenario. Simulations demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed game-theoretic approaches in each the monopolistic and multi-NSP cases.