PROJECT TITLE :

Faster-Better-Cheaper Projects: Too Much Risk or Overreaction to Perceived Failure?

ABSTRACT:

From 1992 until 1999, NASA adopted a Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC) paradigm-i.e., smaller low-value spacecraft-for its unmanned missions. When several early missions met their objectives at a lot of lower value than traditional flagship missions, the FBC approach seemed successful. But, once the failures of two Mars spacecraft in 199nine, the FBC paradigm was viewed as a failed experiment. We replicate on the legacy of FBC. In specific, we focus on the organizational learning literature to explore whether or not FBC, a stretch goal, was a good step for NASA. Previous examinations of FBC have focused on failure rates instead of on value effectiveness. We revisit the question of FBC by examining all unmanned NASA missions launched between 1974 and 2007. We realize that FBC missions resulted in a lot of scientific publications per dollar of mission cost than different types of missions. From our analysis, we perceive lasting benefits to current projects from the adoption of the stretch goals, and understand that NASA suffers from a bias against learning from the FBC experiment as a result of of the stigma of the high-profile failed comes. We tend to conclude with the recommendation that NASA should challenge itself with stretch goals, however with science goals rather than human exploration goals.