PROJECT TITLE :

SimpleMAC: A Simple Wireless MAC-Layer Countermeasure to Intelligent and Insider Jammers

ABSTRACT:

In wireless networks, users share a transmission medium. For efficient channel use, wireless systems usually use a Medium Access Control (MAC) protocol to perform channel coordination by having each node announce its usage intentions and alternative nodes avoid making conflicting transmissions. Historically, such announcements are made on a standard control channel. But, this control channel is liable to jamming as a result of its location is pre-assigned and known to attackers. Furthermore, the announcements themselves provide data useful for jamming. We target a state of affairs where transmitters share spectrum within the presence of intelligent and insider jammers capable of adaptively changing their jamming patterns. Despite the advanced threat model, we tend to propose a simple MAC scheme, called SimpleMAC, that effectively counters network compromise and MAC-aware jamming attacks. We then study the optimal adversarial behavior and analyze the performance of the proposed scheme theoretically, through Monte Carlo simulations, and by implementation on the WARP software-outlined radio platform. As compared to the Nash equilibrium different of disabling the MAC protocol, SimpleMAC quickly attains vastly improved performance and converges to the optimal resolution (over six-fold improvement in SINR and fifty% gains in channel capacity in an exceedingly realistic mobile state of affairs).