PROJECT TITLE :

Analysis of Price of Anarchy in Traffic Networks With Heterogeneous Price-Sensitivity Populations

ABSTRACT:

During this paper, we tend to investigate how the scaled marginal-value road pricing improves the price of anarchy (POA) in a traffic network with one origin-destination pair, where every edge in the network is associated with a latency operate. The POA is outlined as the worst possible ratio between the entire latency of Nash flow and that of the socially optimal flow. All players within the noncooperative congestion game are divided into groups based mostly on their value sensitivities. Initial, we tend to take into account the case where all players are partitioned into two groups in a very network with 2 routes. During this case, it's shown that the total latency of the Nash flow will continuously reach the whole latency of the socially optimal flow if the designed road worth is charged on each link. We tend to then analyze the POA for general case. For a distribution of worth sensitivities satisfying bound conditions, a road pricing scheme is designed such that the unique Nash flow will achieve the social optimal flow, i.e., $text POA=1$ . An algorithm is proposed to find the price theme that optimizes the POA for any distribution of value sensitivities and any traffic network with one origin-destination combine. Finally, the results are applied to a traffic routing problem.