PROJECT TITLE :

On the Security of Key Extraction From Measuring Physical Quantities - 2016

ABSTRACT:

Key extraction via measuring a physical quantity could be a category of information theoretic key exchange protocols that depend on the physical characteristics of the Communication channel, to enable the computation of a shared key by two parties that share no previous secret data. The key's purported to be info theoretically hidden to an eavesdropper. Despite the recent surge of analysis activity in the realm, concrete claims regarding the protection of the protocols usually depend upon channel abstractions that are not absolutely experimentally substantiated. During this paper, we have a tendency to propose a completely unique methodology for the experimental security analysis of those protocols. The crux of our methodology is a falsifiable channel abstraction that is accompanied by an efficient experimental approximation algorithm of the conditional min-entropy obtainable to the parties given the read of the eavesdropper. We concentrate on the signal strength between 2 wirelessly communicating transceivers because the measured amount, and we use an experimental setup to compute the conditional min-entropy of the channel given the read of the attacker that we tend to find to be linearly increasing. Armed with this understanding of the channel, we tend to showcase the methodology by providing a general protocol for key extraction during this setting that's shown to be secure for a concrete parameter choice. During this method, we give a comprehensively analyzed wireless key extraction protocol that is demonstrably secure against passive adversaries assuming our falsifiable channel abstraction. Our use of hidden Markov models as the channel model and a dynamic programming approach to approximate conditional min-entropy might be of freelance interest, whereas different possible instantiations of our methodology can be possible and may be motivated by this paper.