PROJECT TITLE :

Someone in Your Contact List: Cued Recall- Based Textual Passwords - 2017

ABSTRACT:

Textual passwords remain the most commonly utilized user authentication mechanism, and doubtless can still be so for years to return. Despite the well-known security and usefulness issues regarding textual passwords, none of the numerous proposed authentication alternatives seem to possess achieved a sufficient level of adoption to dominate within the foreseeable future. Password hints, consisting of a user generated text saved at the account setup stage, are used in many authentication systems to help users to recall forgotten passwords. However, users are typically unable to make hints that jog the memory without revealing an excessive amount of information concerning the passwords themselves. We have a tendency to propose a rethink of password hints by introducing SY'NTHIMA, a completely unique cued recall-based textual password methodology that reveals no information relating to the password, requires no modifications to authentication servers, and needs no extra setup or registration steps. SY'NTHIMA makes use of users' contact lists, therefore that mapped password hints extracted from a user's contacts are automatically generated whereas the user is typing the password. We tend to create formal models for relevant aspects of the password hint mechanism, define its threat model, and analyze the safety and usability of SY'NTHIMA. We tend to additionally present the results of an in-lab user study of SY'NTHIMA on thirty participants to evaluate its effectiveness and value. The results demonstrate that SY'NTHIMA minimizes the amount of incorrect login makes an attempt and improves long-term password recall, with acceptable login times and positive user feedback. We have a tendency to summarize the teachings learned from the user study, with the hope of provoking any insights regarding the planning of effective cued recall-based mostly textual password schemes.