PROJECT TITLE :

Securing Cloud Data under Key Exposure - 2017

ABSTRACT:

Recent news reveal a powerful attacker which breaks knowledge confidentiality by acquiring cryptographic keys, by suggests that of coercion or backdoors in cryptographic software. Once the encryption key is exposed, the sole viable measure to preserve knowledge confidentiality is to limit the attacker’s access to the ciphertext. This might be achieved, for example, by spreading ciphertext blocks across servers in multiple administrative domains—thus assuming that the adversary cannot compromise all of them. Nevertheless, if data is encrypted with existing schemes, an adversary equipped with the encryption key, can still compromise a single server and decrypt the ciphertext blocks stored therein. In this paper, we tend to study data confidentiality against an adversary which knows the encryption key and has access to a massive fraction of the ciphertext blocks. To the current finish, we tend to propose Bastion, a completely unique and economical theme that guarantees knowledge confidentiality whether or not the encryption secret's leaked and also the adversary has access to almost all ciphertext blocks. We analyze the protection of Bastion, and we tend to evaluate its performance by means that of a prototype implementation. We tend to additionally discuss sensible insights with respect to the integration of Bastion in industrial dispersed storage systems. Our evaluation results recommend that Bastion is well-suited to integration in existing systems since it incurs but fivepercent overhead compared to existing semantically secure encryption modes.