PROJECT TITLE :

A New Service Mechanism for Profit Optimizations of a Cloud Provider and Its Users - 2017

ABSTRACT:

In this paper, we tend to try to design a service mechanism for profit optimizations of both a cloud provider and its multiple users. We consider the matter from a game theoretic perspective and characterize the connection between the cloud provider and its multiple users as a Stackelberg game, in which the ways of all users are subject to that of the cloud provider. The cloud provider tries to pick out and provision acceptable servers and configure a proper request allocation strategy to cut back energy price whereas satisfying its cloud users at the identical time. We have a tendency to approximate its servers choice house by adding a controlling parameter and configure an optimal request allocation strategy. For every user, we tend to style a utility operate which combines the online profit with time potency and strive to maximise its price beneath the strategy of the cloud supplier. We formulate the competitions among all users as a generalized Nash equilibrium downside (GNEP). We solve the problem by employing variational inequality (VI) theory and prove that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium resolution set for the formulated GNEP. Finally, we tend to propose an iterative algorithm (IA), which characterizes the whole method of our proposed service mechanism. We tend to conduct some numerical calculations to verify our theoretical analyses. The experimental results show that our IA algorithm can benefit both of a cloud provider and its multiple users by configuring correct ways.