PROJECT TITLE :

A New Cloud Service Mechanism for Profit Optimizations of a Cloud Provider and Its Users - 2017

ABSTRACT:

In this paper, we tend to try to style a service mechanism for profit optimizations of both a cloud provider and its multiple users. We tend to contemplate the matter from a game theoretic perspective and characterize the link between the cloud provider and its multiple users as a Stackelberg game, in which the strategies of all users are subject to that of the cloud supplier. The cloud provider tries to pick out and provision appropriate servers and configure a proper request allocation strategy to reduce energy price whereas satisfying its cloud users at the same time. We approximate its servers selection space by adding a controlling parameter and configure an optimal request allocation strategy. For each user, we style a utility operate that combines the net profit with time efficiency and attempt to maximise its value underneath the strategy of the cloud supplier. We formulate the competitions among all users as a generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP). We tend to solve the problem by using variational inequality (VI) theory and prove that there exists a generalized Nash equilibrium answer set for the formulated GNEP. Finally, we propose an iterative algorithm (IA), that characterizes the entire process of our proposed service mechanism. We have a tendency to conduct some numerical calculations to verify our theoretical analyses. The experimental results show that our IA algorithm will benefit each of a cloud supplier and its multiple users by configuring proper methods.