PROJECT TITLE :
Fingerprint-Based Detection and Diagnosis of Malicious Programs in Hardware
In nowadays's Integrated Circuit business, a foundry, an Intellectual Property supplier, a design house, or a Pc Aided Design vendor could install a hardware Trojan on a chip that executes a malicious program like one providing an info leaking back door. In this paper, we propose a fingerprint-based technique to detect any computer program in hardware. We tend to propose a tamper-evident design (TEA) which samples runtime signals in a hardware system throughout the performance of a computation, and generates a cryptographic hash-based fingerprint that uniquely identifies a sequence of sampled signals. A hardware Trojan cannot tamper with any sampled signal without leaving tamper proof like a missing or incorrect fingerprint. We any verify fingerprints off-chip such that a hardware Trojan cannot tamper with the verification method. As a case study, we detect hardware-primarily based code injection attacks in a very SPARC V8 architecture LEON2 processor. Primarily based on a light-weight block cipher known as PRESENT, a TEA needs only a 4.fivepercent space increase, while avoiding being detected by the TEA increases the realm of a code injection hardware Trojan with a one KB ROM from two.fivepercent to 36.one% of a LEON2 processor. Such a low value additional allows a lot of advanced tamper diagnosis techniques primarily based on a concurrent generation of multiple fingerprints.
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