PROJECT TITLE :
The Impact of Bidding Rules on Electricity Markets With Intermittent Renewables
The cycling regime of thermal power plants significantly will increase in the presence of intermittent renewables, increasing fuel and operation and maintenance prices from startups. Some regional electricity market operators adopt advanced bidding mechanisms to account for nonconvex price elements that are not reflected within the marginal cost of energy, while other markets rely solely on simple bids with revenue sufficiency conditions. This paper compares the impacts of various bidding rules on wholesale prices and on the remuneration of units in power systems with a important share of renewable generation. We distinguish the consequences of bidding rules from the consequences of regulatory uncertainty that can unexpectedly increase renewable generation by considering two distinct things: one) an “custom-made” capacity combine, that is optimized for any given quantity of renewable penetration, and a couple of) a “nonadapted” capability mix, that is optimized for zero renewable penetration, however operated with completely different nonzero levels of renewables. We have a tendency to show that, although in the transitory state the impact on remuneration of having a nonadapted system dominates over the impact of the startup remuneration mechanisms explored, in equilibrium, bidding rules play an vital role in creating power plants whole whereas impacting on the cost borne by consumers.
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