PROJECT TITLE :
A Study of Truck Platooning Incentives Using a Congestion Game
We have a tendency to introduce an atomic congestion game with 2 types of agents, particularly, cars and trucks, to model the traffic flow on a road over varied time intervals of the day. Cars maximize their utility by finding a tradeoff between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they pay for using the road. As well to those terms, the trucks have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers as a result of they need platooning capabilities, that permit them to save lots of fuel. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between automotive traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We have a tendency to use traffic data from Stockholm, Sweden, to validate components of the modeling assumptions and extract cheap parameters for the simulations. We use joint strategy fictitious play and average strategy fictitious play to find out a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to perceive the influence of numerous factors, like the drivers' worth of time and the share of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices, on the properties of the Nash equilibrium.
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