PROJECT TITLE :
Private and Verifiable Interdomain Routing Decisions
Existing secure interdomain routing protocols will verify validity properties about individual routes, such as whether or not they correspond to a real network path. It's often useful to verify more complex properties relating to the route decision procedure – for instance, whether the chosen route was the most effective one offered, or whether or not it absolutely was in keeping with the network's peering agreements. But, this is tough to do while not knowing a network's routing policy and full routing state, which don't seem to be normally disclosed. In this paper, we have a tendency to show how a network can enable its peers to verify a range of nontrivial properties of its interdomain routing selections without revealing any additional data. If all the properties hold, the peers learn nothing beyond what the interdomain routing protocol already reveals; if a property will not hold, a minimum of one peer can detect this and prove the violation. We tend to present SPIDeR, a practical system that applies this approach to the Border Gateway Protocol, and we have a tendency to report results from an experimental analysis to demonstrate that SPIDeR incorporates a affordable overhead.
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